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DO DAMAGES CAPS REDUCE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE PREMIUMS?: A
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF ESTIMATES AND THE METHODS USED TO PRODUCE THEM
∗
‡
Kathryn Zeiler and Lorian Hardcastle

Abstract
Despite common claims made in policy debates, the theoretical connection between tort reform
and medical malpractice insurance premiums is ambiguous. Simple models suggest reforms such
as statutory damages caps reduce premiums. More elaborate models that account for changes in
physician behavior suggest caps might increase or have no impact on premiums. A number of
empirical studies have been conducted to estimate the impacts of caps on premiums, and several
qualitative literature reviews have attempted to draw general conclusions from the literature. No
review, however, has offered a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the full set of empirical
studies. This Chapter fills that gap. We provide a first glimpse at the wide methodological
variations in the studies that employ regression analysis to estimate the impacts of caps on
medical malpractice insurance premiums. We describe 16 empirical studies that report 197
estimates of the impact of caps on premiums. Using a theory-driven framework to develop a set
of best practices, we find that little weight can be put on any one study due to broad
methodological shortcomings. This Chapter highlights the need for better data and additional
research on the impact of caps on premiums.
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1. Introduction
The medical malpractice liability system is designed to compensate victims of medical
malpractice both for economic damages and non-economic damages, such as pain, suffering and
loss of consortium. A second major function of the system is to provide incentives for health care
professionals to provide reasonable care. 1 By internalizing the cost of injuries to physicians, the
hope is that the threat of malpractice liability will encourage physicians to provide care that will
reduce the likelihood of iatrogenic injuries.
Most providers purchase malpractice insurance to protect themselves against the risk of
claims. Over the last several decades, insurance prices have fluctuated wildly, and the liability
system, and large damage awards in particular, is most often pointed to as the culprit. The U.S.
has faced three distinct medical malpractice insurance crises since the mid-1970s. These crises
are characterized by sharp increases in premiums followed by market exit by some insurers,
which reduces supply, putting additional upward pressure on prices.
Each crisis has triggered a call for major reform of the tort system. U.S. states began
implementing tort reforms during the mid-1970s, with subsequent waves of reforms in the mid1980s and early-2000s (Mello, 2006; Nelson et al., 2007). One of the most popular reforms, caps
on damages available at trial, has taken center stage. 2 Congress continues to consider whether to
implement a federal cap on non-economic damages, which all states would be required to impose
on jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases (Hyman and Sage, 2011; House bill H.R. 5 (March
22, 2012)).

1

The general standard of care is that which a reasonable physician in the same class as the treating physician would
have provided. Class is determined by factors such as knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. See e.g.,
Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital, 710 A.2d. 161 (1998).
2
By Ronen Avraham’s (2011) latest count, nine states impose some sort of cap on total medical malpractice
damages, 26 on non-economic damages and 31 on punitive damages.

2

The question of whether caps reduce premiums is important. Evidence suggests that caps
come with costs, such as disproportionate effects on economically disadvantaged groups and
vulnerable segments of the population (e.g., Rubin and Shepherd, 2008). So if the benefits
legislators promise in the form of lower premiums—and adequate physician supply 3 and lower
health care costs 4—are not realized, caps result in a net loss. While legislators also argue that
caps will reduce defensive medicine, recent studies indicate that doctors engage in much less
defensive medicine than is commonly argued. 5 If legislatures are left to hang their hats only on
premium reductions as the primary benefit of caps, understanding the relationship between caps
and premiums is critical.
While simple theoretical models predict that caps will lower payouts and thus lower
premiums, more nuanced models suggest that the story might not be so simple. Models that
account for the potential impact of caps on provider treatment choices and their decisions over
how much effort to expend to develop and maintain medical expertise predict that caps will
increase injury rates, at least under some conditions. In turn, this may cause an increase in claim
rates, total payouts by medical malpractice insurers, and malpractice insurance prices.
These theories have been put to the test in a number of empirical studies. Since the early
1980s, researchers have generated empirical research studies investigating the impacts of caps on

3

See e.g., Yang et al. (2008), which summarizes the empirical literature and provides evidence that caps do not
seem to impact obstetrician/gynecologists’ location decisions.
4
Little is currently known about the impact of caps on health care costs. See Avraham and Schanzenbach (2010) for
a review of the scant literature and evidence that caps reduce private health care insurance premiums by a modest
amount.
5
Proponents of caps commonly claim that consumers benefit from the impact caps have on defensive medicine.
Specifically, the claim is that caps reduce the number of unnecessary medical procedures physician prescribe solely
to protect themselves from medical malpractice liability. Recent evidence, however, suggests that defensive
medicine accounts for a relatively small portion of total health care costs. See e.g., Sloan and Shadle (2009),
Thomas, et al. (2010). Mello et al. (2010) use a back-of-the-envelope method to estimate that defensive medicine
comprised 2.4% of health care spending in 2008.

3

premiums. While the general consensus seems to be that caps slow the growth of premiums, 6 a
closer and more comprehensive look at the empirical literature reveals mixed results at best. A
deeper look also reveals wide variation in the methods used to produce the results.
The aim of this study is two-fold. First, we examine how strongly the literature as a
whole supports the claim that caps slow the growth of premiums. Using a basic “vote count”
method, we find that only 61 (31%) of the 197 estimates reported in 16 studies suggest that caps
reduce premiums (at the 10% significance level using one-tailed tests). While this result might
seem to contradict the general conclusion that caps reduce premiums, the usefulness of reported
results depends strongly on the methods employed to produce them.
Our second aim, therefore, is to gauge the level of confidence we can place on reported
results. We do this by taking a detailed look at the methods used to produce results not only at
the study level but also at the estimate level. While other literature reviews count studies as
either supporting the caps-reduce-premiums claim or rejecting it (Mello 2010; RAND 2011), 14
of the 16 studies report numerous estimates computed using different methods. In each of the 14
studies, the results are mixed. By assessing results at the estimate level, we provide the most
nuanced set of conclusions that confidentially can be drawn from the existing empirical
literature.
The conclusions are not heartening. After assessing the studies along several
dimensions—generalizability of results given data employed, attention to possible model
assumption violations, additional sources of measurement error and controls for omitted variable
bias—we find that no one study employs a consistently solid set of empirical methods. In fact,
most studies come with a number of serious limitations. The bottom-line conclusion is that the

6

“The most recent controlled studies show that caps moderately constrain the growth of premiums.” Mello (2006)
Note that Mello also summarizes studies that do not support this claim.
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literature is in need of better data and more methodologically sound analysis based on
comprehensive theoretical models of how various factors, including damages caps, impact
premiums.
This chapter is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the existing literature, both
theoretical and empirical. Part 3 provides a systematic review of the empirical literature at the
estimate level. After summarizing the estimation methods used and their purposes, we assess the
validity of the reported results. We find that little weight can be placed on any estimate reported
in the literature given deficiencies in estimation techniques. We describe flaws common to every
study and discuss the need for a better dataset to measure malpractice insurance premiums. Part 4
concludes and offers a roadmap for future research.
2. Existing Literature
A. The Theoretical Relationship Between Caps and Premiums
Theoretical accounts of the impacts of statutory damages caps on medical malpractice
insurance premiums have produced varying predictions. The most basic analyses predict that
damages caps will reduce recoveries and claim rates, reduce the time it takes to settle claims and
reduce overall litigation expenses (Rubin, 1993; CBO, 2011). Some predict that tort reforms will
create a more stable liability environment with less underwriting uncertainty (Born and Viscusi,
1998; Barker, 1992). 7 These effects, it is argued, will lead to a reduction in medical malpractice
insurance premiums.
Alternative accounts of the impacts of caps on premiums consider second-order effects
and whether caps would, in fact, bind recoveries. For example, Hyman et al. (2007) use data on

7

Note that these studies acknowledge that the causality may be reversed—instead of reforms improving insurer
profitability, insurer behavior may determine a states’ willingness to enact reforms. The mechanisms through which
tort reforms influence premiums are important to understand so that empirical models can account for the
complexities.

5

Texas closed medical malpractice claims to explore why amounts plaintiffs collect are so often
well below the amounts juries award. Their results suggest that the discrepancy is due in part to
the fact that plaintiffs rarely collect the portion of damage awards that exceeds the defendant
physicians’ per occurrence policy limit. The authors argue that limits on collectability of
amounts of the policy limit can “substantially mute the real-world impact of statutory caps”
(Hyman et al., 2007, p. 53). Others have suggested that plaintiffs’ attorneys react to damages
caps by arguing more vigorously for damages that are not capped, often economic damages such
as lost wages, and that juries simply substitute higher damages of the uncapped varieties for
capped damages (Sharkey, 2005).
Others have considered the impacts of caps on incentives for providers to engage in
costly activities that reduce the likelihood of patient injuries. Zeiler (2003) argues that although
caps might reduce average payouts, they also might increase the number of claims, thereby
failing to reduce overall costs of covering physician liability. As caps reduce exposure to
liability, the argument goes, the benefits physicians (and the managed care organizations that
influence their treatment choices) enjoy from providing expensive treatments are diminished. At
the margin, this theory predicts that caps lead to more iaogenic injuries. Similarly, Arlen and
MacLeod (2005) predict that caps will reduce physician investment in costly efforts to maintain
and develop expertise. Thus, total medical malpractice insurer losses will depend on the
influence of caps on claim rates relative to average claim payouts. While total losses might
decrease, these theories predict that, under some conditions, they will remain stable or increase. 8
B. Empirical Tests of the Predicted Impacts of Caps on Premiums
The temporal and geographic variation in tort reform implementation has allowed
researchers to compare premiums pre-cap and post-cap in states that implemented caps and to
8

Rubin and Shepherd (2008) find that caps increase female death rates.

6

compare states with caps to those without caps. Researchers have employed the information to
estimate the impact of reforms, including damages caps, on malpractice insurance premiums. As
this evidence accumulated, researchers began to produce literature reviews, drawing general
conclusions from the numerous studies. Our search 9 revealed seven relevant reviews: OTA,
1993; CBO, 2004; Kessler, 2006; Kane and Emmons, 2005 and 2007 (discussed as a single
study); Nelson et al., 2007; Studdert and Mello, 2004, Mello, 2006, Mello and Kachalia, 2010,
and Kachalia and Mello, 2011 (discussed as a single study10); and RAND, 2011. 11
Appendix 1 summarizes the scope of each literature review. The reviews include
different sets of primary studies, although none covers all 16 studies included in our analysis.
Some describe the method used to include particular studies and exclude others, most of which
involve an evaluation of the strength of the empirical methods the primary study authors used
and whether and by whom the study was published. Most reviews draw general conclusions
about the impacts of several tort reforms, while some focus on the impacts of caps. Some
reviews go beyond our variable of interest—premiums—to consider the impacts of tort reform
on payment size, claim rates, defensive medicine, physician supply, quality of care, defense
costs, and health expenditures. We focus solely on the association between caps and premiums,
the question most widely studied and of central interest in current political debates.

9

Our goal was to identify all literature reviews drawing general conclusions about the impacts of damages caps on
premiums from studies that employed regression analyses. We searched several databases (PubMed, EconLit,
SSRN, ProQuest Theses and Dissertations, Catalog of U.S. Government Publications, Academic Search Primer,
Google Scholar, ABI/Inform Global, Goggle Books, Westlaw and Index to Legal Periodicals) generally using the
following search term: (“tort reform” OR “damage cap” OR “damage caps” OR “damages caps”) AND (“literature
review” OR “systematic review”). Because literature reviews (particularly government reports) tend not to selfidentify as “literature reviews,” we searched for papers citing the primary tort reform studies. Finally, we searched
the bibliographies of the literature reviews to find references to other reviews.
10
Studdert and Mello, 2004 is a shorter, less detailed version of Mello, 2006. Mello and Kachalia, 2010 includes
more recent information. Kachalia and Mello, 2011 is a shorter version of the 2010 paper, with little additional
information.
11
This literature review used Mello’s 2006 methodology but addressed more recent cap studies. There is significant
overlap between the RAND review and Mello’s 2010 update of her 2006 paper.
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The two most recent and comprehensive reviews to date conclude that damages caps
likely reduce premiums. The first by Mello and co-authors (2006 and 2010) is the most
sophisticated review. The 2010 version includes eight primary studies. The authors set out the
following criteria for assessing the rigorousness of a study: a sufficiently comprehensive data
source, low potential for error or bias, appropriateness of methodology, adequacy of controls for
confounding variables, adequacy of sample size, and appropriateness of interpretation and
conclusions. The authors conclude that more recent data suggest that caps reduce premiums by
6-13%, although the authors cite numerous studies that report no effect on premiums.
The second recent review by RAND (2010) piggybacks off the work of Mello and her coauthors. This brief review updates Mello’s 2006 findings, employs a similar methodology for
study inclusion, and corroborates Mello’s conclusions. Summarizing her earlier findings, the
RAND review concluded that four studies (two of which were methodologically strong) showed
a link between caps and reduced premiums and four studies (one strong) did not.
While both reviews are helpful in demonstrating the variation in reported results, they
come with an important limitation. Specifically, both reviews classify studies “as having
significant findings if any specification of a damages cap variable was statistically significant.”
(Mello, 2006, p. 10) In doing so, they brush aside ubiquitous within-study variation in results. 12
None of the primary studies included in the Mello et al. and RAND reviews reported consistent
results; at least half of each study’s results failed to support the claim that caps reduce
premiums. 13
12

Mello’s review lists Zuckerman et al (1990), Danzon et al. (2004), Thorpe (2004) and Viscusi & Born (2005) as
support for the claim that caps reduce premiums even though 3 of 6, 4 of 6, 4 of 6 and 9 of 12 results, respectively,
failed to support the claim at the 10% significance level (see Table 1 below). Despite these mixed results, Mello
concludes (from Danzon et al, Thorpe and Viscusi et al.) that “studies based on data from the 1990s and the early
years of the current malpractice crisis consistently found that caps had a modest but statistically significant
constraining effect on premiums during this period…” (p. 12; emphasis added)
13
Section 3, infra, details the individual results reported by each study.

8

Our goal is two-fold. First, we aim to present a more comprehensive and detailed
summary of results from primary research studies, taking into account the widespread withinstudy variation. Second, we attempt a more nuanced evaluation of the methodological soundness
of studies based on the use of theory-driven best methods.
3. Systematic Literature Review
A. Overview of Primary Study Results
Our first step involved collecting all relevant empirical studies. As described in Appendix
3, we tailored our search terms to particular research databases. We reviewed each relevant result
for additional studies our searches had not captured and for mentions of unreported regressions
(e.g., robustness checks). We were unable to obtain results from unreported regressions. 14 Our
analysis includes all of the studies from the literature reviews and additional studies not included
in any reviews (in bold type in Table 1). We identified 16 studies reporting 197 estimates of the
impact of caps on premiums.
We begin with the most basic inquiry: considering all available evidence from regression
analyses that estimate the association between caps and premiums, how strongly does the
evidence support the common claim that caps reduce premiums? Summary statistics computed
using the entire set of results suggest a closer look is warranted. Only 61 (31%) of the 197
reported results support the claim that caps are associated with a statistically significant decrease
in premiums (10% significance level for one-tailed test). Forty-nine of the 197 results (25%)
support the claim at the 5% significance level.

14

Sloan, 1985; Danzon et al., 2004; Viscusi and Born, 1995; Viscusi and Born, 2005: no longer have records.
Barker, 1992: would take considerable time to review methodology and find unreported regression records. Crain et
al., 2009: no access to records. Grace and Leverty, 2011: paper in progress so other results not yet available.
Zuckerman et al., 1990; Thorpe, 2004: no response.

9

Researchers have used three different proxies for premiums. Some studies use premiums
paid by physicians of certain specialties for policies with identical policy limits and duration. For
example, Sloan (1985) uses survey data on premiums paid by general practitioners,
ophthalmologists, and orthopedic surgeons for policies with limits of $100,000 per occurrence
and $300,000 over the coverage period (“$100,000/$300,000 policies”). Bhat (2001) uses
premiums charged by a single multi-state medical malpractice insurer for physicians of the same
risk class and for $1M/$3M policies. Others use aggregate premiums written (Blackmon et al.,
1991; Viscusi et al. 1993) or aggregate premiums earned (Viscusi and Born, 1995; Born and
Viscusi 1998) as a proxy for price. 15 Finally, several authors employ loss ratios—the ratio of
losses incurred by an insurer to total premiums earned by that insurer—as a proxy for price. The
inverse of this ratio represents the effective price of insurance: the amount physicians pay for
each dollar the insurer indemnifies. 16 Thus, if caps are correlated with increased loss ratios, we
can conclude that caps reduce the effective price of insurance.
Similarly, primary study authors have studied a variety of damages caps. Some study the
impact of caps on non-economic compensatory damages (e.g., pain and suffering). Others study
the impacts of punitive damages caps, while others investigate the impact of caps on total
damages, or they group together caps of various sorts. 17 Some have posited different impacts for
different types of caps (e.g., Sharkey (2005) argues that punitive damages will have a smaller

15

“Premiums written” is the total premiums generated from all policies written by an insurer within a given period
of time (cash basis of accounting for premiums). “Premiums earned” is the portion of the total premium amount
corresponding to the coverage provided during a given time period (accrual basis of accounting for premiums).
16
The loss ratio “can be used as a measure of the relative price of insurance because it reflects the proportion of
premium dollars that are returned in the form of loss payments to those insured.” (Barker, 1992, p. 145); “[O]ne can
view the loss ratio as a measure of the inverse of the ex post unit price of insurance.” (Viscusi and Born, 2005, p. 38)
17
This group includes cap of any sort, cap on total damages or immunities from liability, caps on the total amount
physicians pay but not the amount patients received, caps on economic and non-economic damages, caps on
economic and/or non-economic damages, and caps on economic or non-economic damages.

10

impact on premiums relative to non-economic and economic caps because punitive damages are
rarely awarded in medical malpractice cases).
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the result counts by premium proxy type. It also lists the
publication type of each study and the years covered by the premiums data and the caps data.
The breakdown reveals a substantial difference in the pattern of results depending on the proxy
used for premiums. When premiums per physician or aggregate premiums are employed, 5557% of the results are not significant at the 10% level, 7-10% of results are significant at the
10% level (but not the 5% level) and 34-35% are significant at the 5% level. When researchers
use loss ratios as a proxy for premiums, none of the results supports the claim that caps reduce
premiums at the 10% level.
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Table 1: Features of primary studies

Study
(first author)

Publication
type

Premiums
period

Caps period

Sloan 85
Zuckerman 90
Blackmon 91
Barker 92
Viscusi 93
Viscusi 95
Born 98
Guis 98
Bhat 01
Zeiler 03
Danzon 04
Thorpe 04
Viscusi 05
Kilgore 06
Crain 09
Grace 11
Total

PRJ
PRJ
book chapter
PRJ
PRJ
PRJ
Brookings Inst.
PRJ
book
dissertation
Brookings Inst.
PRJ
PRJ
PRJ
PR Inst
unpublished

1974-1978
1974-1986
1985, 1988
1977-1986
1988
1985-1991
1985-1991
1976-1990
1990-1994
1991-2001
1994-2003
1985-2001
1984-1991
1991-2004
2004, 2006
1985-2005

1974-1978
1974-1986
1986
1975
1985-1987
1985-1987
1985-1987
1976-1990
1990-1994
1991-2001
1994-2003
1985-2001
1984-1991
1991-2004
2004, 2006
1985-2005

# of
estimates

14
6
4
4
6
6
42
1
4
4
6
6
12
45
1
36
197

Premium Paid/Doc
Not s.s.

5-10%

13
3

5%

Aggregate Premiums
Not
s.s.

5-10%

Not s.s.

510%

5%

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

1
3
2

1

2
2
2
1

23

5

17
1

47
(57%)

6
(7%)

29
(35%)

2

3

12

4
3
3
21

1
3

1

1
2

2
6

13
32
(55%)

2
6
(10%)

3
20
(34%)

18
57
(100%)

3
3
6
1
2
1
4
1

5%

Loss Ratio

Notes: PRJ = peer-reviewed journal; PR Inst = Pacific Research Institute; Not s.s. = not statistically significant at the 10% level (one-tailed test); 510% = significant at the 10% level, but not at 5%; 5% = significant at the 5% level. Bolded studies were not included in any prior literature review.
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The average p-value produced by 194 one-tailed tests of significance is 0.47 (standard
deviation = 0.40). 18 Figure 1 displays the distribution of observed or estimated one-tailed pvalues for results produced using different proxies for premiums.

Figure 1: Distribution of one-tailed p-values by premium proxy
Premium Paid per Physician

Aggregate Premiums

Loss Ratios

The Figure demonstrates that conclusions drawn from the empirical literature depend greatly
on the proxy. Although the majority of results produced using per-physician premiums and
18

Thorpe (2004) did not provide sufficient information to estimate p-values related to three of the six results he
reported.

13

aggregate premiums are statistically insignificant at the 10% level, these proxies are much more
likely to produce statistically significant results than loss ratios. The results produced using loss
ratios support the claim that insurers collect more in premiums per indemnified dollar after caps
are implemented.
As Mello et al. (2006, 2010) point out, vote counts can be misleading if some of the
studies producing results are not methodologically sound. In the following section we describe
the methods commonly used by primary study authors to obtain valid results. That section is
followed by a discussion of what we can infer from the literature given the methods employed.
B. Estimation Methods
Had policy makers implemented caps randomly over states and years while holding all
else constant, estimating the impact of caps on premiums merely would entail comparing the
difference in premiums before and after the implementation of caps in the treatment states
relative to differences in the control states over the same time period. Estimation is not so simple
given that states did not implement caps randomly from year to year and all else was not held
constant. Therefore, the validity of results depends on the use of methods to control for
measurement error and whether the necessary assumptions of the chosen empirical model are
satisfied. In addition, the data employed will impact generalizability of reported results. This
subsection describes methods necessary to produce valid and generalizable results. 19
1. Model and Sample Selection
The most preliminary choices researchers make involve selection of the empirical model,
the sample size, the level of observation (e.g., state or insurance company), and the time period
covered by the data.
19

Note that this section is not intended to be a comprehensive list of such necessary methods. The discussion is
tailored to the methods employed in the 16 original studies. Our goal is to provide a sense of some of the common
methods for properly modeling the impacts of policy changes on outcomes.

14

Every original study uses one of three basic model types: ordinary least squares (OLS),
weighted least squares (WLS) and quantile regression (QR). OLS models estimate linear
relationships by minimizing the sum of squared errors (e.g., differences between observed
premiums and values predicted by the linear approximation). WLS models employ OLS
techniques but weight the observations to take into account the possibility that not all
observations are equal (e.g., Barker (1992) assumes the variance of error decreases
proportionally as risk exposure increases and, thus, weights observations by a function of the
premium volume by state). QR models are used to account for the possibility that caps
differentially impact firms (e.g., firms of various sizes or profitability levels (Born et al., 1998))
and that outliers might impact estimates.
Studies also vary with respect to the level of observation. Some researchers use panel
data with observations at the state-year level (Gius, 2004); others use panels with observations at
the insurer-state-year level (Zuckerman, 1990; Kilgore, 2006); and some employ cross-sectional
datasets, with all states observed in a single year (Viscusi and Born, 2005). 20 Panel datasets are
known to produce more precise estimates, partly because they come with larger sample sizes,
which allow for higher degrees of freedom. 21 Generally, the power of the statistical test
increases as the number of degrees of freedom increases. The higher the power, the higher the
likelihood of detecting an effect if one exists.
Along the same lines, the number of years covered by the data will impact the precision
of the results. The primary studies cover a range of time periods for which caps are coded and for
which insurance outcomes are recorded. For example, Viscusi and Born (1995) and Born et al.
(1998) considered whether variation in caps enacted during the years 1985-1987 explains any of
20

All studies that cover multiple years adjust premiums for inflation.
The number of degrees of freedom is equal to the sample size minus the number of independent variables included
in the regression equation minus 1 (for the constant term).
21

15

the variation in premiums across insurers for the years 1985-1991. Guis (1998) used a panel
dataset, which included variation in both caps and premiums for the years 1976-1990. Earlier
studies typically consider a substantially smaller range of years (e.g., Zuckerman (1990) argued
that Sloan’s (1985) results might be impacted by the fact that his data cover only four years).
2. Generalizability
The extent to which we can generalize from reported results depends on the
characteristics of the data employed and whether those characteristics generalize to the
population about which claims are made. All 16 original studies draw general conclusions about
the impact of damages caps on insurance premiums. Given the nature of the data, however, such
claims might be too broad in some cases.
First, reported results vary over the time periods studied. This variation might be due to
changes over time in impacts caps have on prices. For example, caps that are not inflationadjusted might become more binding over time, leading to a decrease in prices). Alternatively, it
might result from unobservable changes to markets or the liability system that are unrelated to
but correlated with caps. For example, changes in the average medical malpractice policy size
purchased, which is typically unobservable (i.e., the data are difficult to obtain), might impact
premiums. 22 If unobservable features change over time, putting the greatest weight on recent
studies might be most prudent (assuming the current environment is most similar to the
environment during the most recently studied years) (Mello, 2006).
Second, and more importantly, the data employed to measure premiums should allow
us to draw general conclusions from the results. To start, the data should act as a good proxy for
premiums. If we have reason to believe that caps impact premiums differently than the variable

22

Zeiler et al. (2007) report that Texas physicians that have made payments to claimants have purchased policies
with lower policy limits over time.

16

used as a proxy, generalizing from the proxy to premiums is problematic. Alternatively, the
proxy might be a good one but might represent a small slice of the population of interest. Again,
if we have reason to believe that caps might impact premiums of different types of policies
differently, then we should be careful about generalizing from a subset of policy types to all
policy types. The data used in the 16 original studies come from a variety of sources, cover a
variety of provider types and include a variety of coverages (i.e., policy limits), which are
sometimes controlled in the analysis. In some cases inferences about the impacts of caps on
premiums are restricted to policies with a certain level of coverage (e.g., $100,000 per
occurrence and $300,000 annual aggregate). In other cases, policy limits are controlled so that
variation in premiums related to variation in coverage is separated from premiums variation
caused by variation in caps. In the latter case, the estimated impact of caps on premiums is
interpreted as the average impact across all policy types.
Finally, some studies estimating the impacts of caps on non-economic damages identify
separately the impacts of caps of different types. Some studies consider the impacts of caps of
different sizes (e.g., non-economic caps cannot exceed $250,000). Others consider the impacts of
permanent caps separately from the impacts of temporary caps, which eventually are overturned
or repealed (Grace and Leverty, 2011).
3. Model assumption violations 23
The primary studies employ a wide variety of empirical modeling techniques. As
mentioned, OLS is the most commonly employed regression model. This model requires several
assumptions to be satisfied. The most widely violated assumptions include non-normal
distribution of error terms, heteroskedastic error terms, serial correlation of error terms, and

23

The technical details included in this section are explained in basic econometrics textbooks. E.g., see Wooldridge
(2008) and Greene (2002).

17

simultaneity. 24 For our purposes, the technical details of these assumption violations are
unimportant. We focus instead on whether primary study authors properly attended to them.
Non-normal distribution of error terms. The basic linear regression model assumes that
error terms are normally distributed. A non-normally distributed dependent variable can result in
non-normally distributed error terms. When a dependent variable takes on only positive values
(e.g., premiums), a common approach used to nudge the error terms towards a normal
distribution is to log-transform the dependent variable. While this transformation might result in
error terms that satisfy the normality assumption, it is not a guaranteed fix. Alternative
transformations might solve the problem.
Heteroskedastic error terms. If errors term variances are not constant across different
values of the independent variables, our confidence in hypothesis test results is compromised.
Methods used to address this problem include computing heteroskedastic-consistent standard
errors (robust standard errors more generally) or computing standard errors using a bootstrap
resampling technique. Log-transforming the dependent variable gets around the problem in some
cases but is not a guaranteed fix. WLS regression is sometimes used to control for
heteroskedasticity, but the weights must be chosen carefully and with heteroskedasticity
specifically in mind. 25
Serial correlation of error terms. Most primary studies use panel datasets, which are
comprised of data collected from each state (or several companies within a state) over a number
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The basic linear regression model also assumes that the relationship between the dependent variable and every
continuous independent variable is linear. Since most independent variables employed in the original studies are
binary, this assumption is not one that requires much attention. It should be noted, however, that no study mentions
verifying linearity when continuous variables (e.g., income, insurance market size) are employed as controls. If the
model does not properly capture the relationship between premiums and the controls, the estimate of the impacts of
caps on premiums might be biased.
25
Only Barker (1992) uses weighted least squares regression specifically to address heteroskedasticity. She relies,
however, on the untested assumption that the variance of the error decreases proportionally as the number of risk
exposures increases.
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of years. This type of data often violates the assumption of uncorrelated error terms. While serial
correlation does not lead to biased estimates, it can lead to faulty conclusions about statistical
significance. Tests have been designed to detect the problem, and, if the problem presents,
standard errors must be corrected (e.g., Bertrand, et al. (2004)) or a model other than the standard
OLS should be used (e.g., auto-regressive model, moving average model, feasible generalized
least squares) (King and Roberts, 2012). As with every model, the alternative models will
produce valid results only if the model’s assumptions are satisfied. In addition, if the problem
does not exist and a correction is adopted, the results could be invalid.
A second common method for addressing possible serial correlation is by clustering
standard errors by group. Dependence among observations often arises in data with a group
structure. For example, premiums set by the same company in the same state might be influenced
by similar factors over time, so that relative high premiums in one year might imply relatively
high premiums in other years. This might not be a perfect solution, however, if the number of
clusters is relatively small or the number of years covered by the dataset is small. Typically if
standard errors are clustered by state and all 50 states are included in the dataset, results are
likely to be valid. (Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 323)
Simultaneity. The basic linear regression model also assumes that independent variables
are exogenous, which, in the present context, requires that changes in premiums over time do not
influence the likelihood that caps are implemented. The probability that caps are implemented,
however, likely depends on trends in premiums; changes in premiums and the likelihood of cap
implementation theoretically impact one another simultaneously. If the simultaneity assumption
is not satisfied, the researcher can address it by using a number of possible methods including an
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instrumental variables approach, propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and
randomization inference (Donohue and Ho, 2007; Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005).
4. Additional sources of measurement error
Obtaining correct estimates of the impacts of caps on premiums requires a fine-tuned
coding method. Zuckerman (1990) notes that better estimates are produced when tort reforms are
coded using effective dates rather than enacted dates, as these dates can differ in some cases. He
also points out the importance of coding tort reforms in a way that accounts for legislative
repeals and court decisions to strike down reforms as unconstitutional. Similarly, Grace and
Leverty (2011) hypothesized that the presence or absence of caps is insufficient to predict insurer
behavior—one must also consider the likelihood of judicial nullification. They consider
temporary reforms separately from permanent reforms.
In addition, researchers sometimes account for the possibility of insurers’ delayed
response to legal reforms due, for example, to uncertainty around possible effects of the change
(Danzon, 2004; Zuckerman et al., 1990). 26 Several authors suggest that no-effect results might be
caused by lack of attention to the possibility that reforms often take several years to have an
impact given the long-tailed nature of the legal claims. 27 Including lags of tort reform variables
in the regression model 28 is a common method of accounting for a possible delayed response.
Others have suggested the opposite reaction—that insurers actually anticipate changes
to tort law and adjust prices prior to the change. If actors anticipate changes to tort law in some
future year, premiums in the current year might reflect these predictions (Malani and Reif, 2011).
26

As Born and Viscusi (1998) hypothesize, insurer losses will first reflect the impact of tort reforms, but premium
changes might lag for several reasons including the need to obtain regulatory approval for rate changes.
27
For example, Thorpe (2004) cites unpublished data from one large insurer revealing that nearly 12% of claims
took at least eight years to resolve.
28
Rather than, or in addition to, including an independent variable for tort law in effect in the year premiums are
measured, an independent variable for tort law in place in the previous year(s) is included to capture the impacts of
reforms passed in previous years.

20

Grace and Leverty (2011) theorize that while anticipation of the implementation of a damages
cap will not impact prices prior to implementation, insurers might adjust insurance prices in
anticipation of judicial strike downs of caps. The same might be posited for legislative changes
to previously implemented caps. Grace and Leverty account for this possibility by separately
estimating the impacts of permanent caps—those that are not deemed unconstitutional by the
court—and temporary caps—those eventually overturned by the court. Others suggest
incorporating “leads” of tort reform variables, 29 although knowing whether the evidence supports
anticipation or simultaneity is difficult.
Researchers have also recognized the importance of properly weighting observations to
obtain accurate average effect sizes that reflect, for example, market share (e.g., when insurerlevel premiums data is used to construct the dependent variable) and market size (e.g., when
state-level premiums data are used). Weighting ensures that, when computing estimates of the
average impacts of caps on premiums, more weight is placed, for example, on firms with larger
market shares or on states with larger insurance markets. While failing to properly weight
observations does not impact the statistical significance or sign of the result, it produces a biased
estimate of the average impacts of caps.
Finally, OLS estimates are known to be sensitive to outliers, sometimes called influential
observations. An observation is influential if the estimate changes by a practically large amount
when the observation is dropped from the dataset. All else constant, the likelihood of the
presence of outliers in the dataset is reduced as the sample size increases. Log-transforming the
dependent variable can make the estimate less sensitive to outliers, but influential outliers might

29

Rather than, or in addition to, including an independent variable for tort law in effect in the year premiums are
measured, an independent variable for tort law in place in the future year(s) is included.
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remain. Similarly, estimates produced using QR models are less sensitive to outliers, but these
models do not guarantee a remedy.
5. Controlling omitted variable bias
In a perfect world, we would estimate the impact of caps on premiums by randomly
assigning states to treatment (caps) and control (no caps) groups and measuring the difference,
post-treatment, between average premiums across the two groups. The function of randomized
assignment is to generate two groups of states with roughly the same distributions of
characteristics so differences in premiums after caps are imposed can be attributed to the caps
and not to differences in other covariates that might be correlated with the imposition of caps.
Controlling for these covariates reduces the possibility that a portion of the impact the model
attributes to caps should actually be attributed to other characteristics of the treatment states.
Given that caps were not randomly assigned to states, researchers use methods to control
both observable and unobservable covariates. Several features of insurance markets and the
liability system other than caps impact premiums. If one or more of these features is correlated
with the implementation of caps and is left out of the analysis, the estimated impact of cap on
premiums will be inaccurate. Methodologically sound studies employ a number of controls to
separate the effects of variables other than damages caps on premiums to reduce omitted variable
bias.
A great deal of variation across the 16 empirical studies arises from different choices over
control variables. All studies control for other tort reforms (e.g., collateral source rules,
modifications to joint and several liability, patient compensation funds, periodic payment
reforms, time limits on claims including statutes of limitations and repose, implementation
of pretrial screening panels, arbitration rules, ad damnum reforms, expert witness reforms,
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and prohibition against punitive damages insurance), but they include different sets of
reforms. 30 These controls are especially important as reforms tend to be passed as packages,
which increases the likelihood of correlation between caps and other types of reforms and, in
turn, the likelihood of omitted variable bias absent controls.
Researchers often mitigate omitted variable bias by including controls for features other
than tort reforms that are either known or suspected to impact premiums and that might be
correlated with the passage of damages caps. These include controls for potential claimant
demographics (e.g., urbanization level, income per capita, citizen ideology), exposure to
health care services (e.g., number of surgeries per capita, number of physicians per capita),
insurance market characteristics (e.g., market concentration, insurer organizational form,
size of insurance market, intensity of insurance price regulations, whether the state runs a
joint underwriting association, rates of return on investments), and attorney market
characteristics (e.g., restrictions on legal fees, number of attorneys per capita). The
magnitude of impacts on results depends on the strength of correlations between damages caps
and each control variable.
Some researchers employ techniques to mitigate omitted variable bias caused by
unobservable variables. For example, Guis (1998) argues that results from previous studies are
biased because they do not control for unobservable differences across states and years. Cross
sectional fixed effects are used to control variables that are constant across time but vary across
units (states or insurers). Time fixed effects control for variables that are constant across units
but vary over time. Some include a linear time trend to isolate general trends in premiums over

30

In some cases, researchers (e.g., Viscusi (1993)) coded binary variables to track whether states enacted any of a
number of different tort reforms (e.g., any number of pro-defendant reforms, any reforms in place prior to
premiums period, any reforms in place other than caps). This method produces more noise than methods that
include separate controls for covariates.
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time that might confound estimates of the impact of caps on premiums. In some cases,
researchers include a lagged dependent variable for the same reason, although this technique is
problematic when a panel dataset is used. (Hsiao, 2003)
Finally, a common technique used to estimate the impacts of policy changes is
difference-in-differences (DID) models. The method is considered “quasi-experimental”—
jurisdictions that implement the policy comprise the treatment group and non-implementers act
as the control group. The function of the control group is to difference out any impact on the
dependent variable caused by contemporaneous changes that occurred in all jurisdictions at the
time of the policy change. The standard DID model incorporates cross sectional (e.g., state) fixed
effects and year fixed effects along with a set of observed covariates as additional controls.
Importantly, validity of DID model estimates depends heavily on two assumptions that
often are overlooked. First, the model assumes that the policy was randomly assigned across
state-years. This assumption is violated if features of the environment not accounted for in the
model impact the likelihood that a state implements the policy31 or if the policy is likely to
remain in effective in an adopting state after the first year of implementation (Bertrand et al.,
2004). 32 Second, the model assumes that policy implementation does not impact the covariates.
If, for example, caps impact the number of physicians per capita, thereby increasing physician
supply and decreasing the population by affecting mortality, the estimates of the impacts of caps
on premiums will suffer from post-treatment bias (Ho, 2005). 33

31

E.g., if premiums naturally cycle over time and caps are adopted only when premiums reach a certain threshold,
then changes in premiums might be attributed to caps when they are actually a function of the underwriting cycle.
(Donohue and Ho, 2007).
32
DID models assume that the likelihood of a reform being in place in one state-year is independent of whether the
reform is in place in any other state-year. In contrast, a reform that is in place in one state-year is likely to be in
place the following year in that state.
33
Including and excluding possibly tainted covariates to assess sensitivity might not help (Rosenbaum, 1984).
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With these guidelines in mind, we now assess the validity of the estimates reported in the
literature.
C. Validity Assessment
Tables 5-7 summarize the methods employed to produce each estimate reported in the
literature. 34 Tables 5a-c include all results from analyses that group together various types of
damages caps (e.g., caps on non-economic damages, punitive damages, total damages, etc.).
Table 5a includes estimates of the impact on premiums paid per doctor. Table 5b includes
estimates on aggregate premiums, and Table 5c on loss ratios. Each row in the table represents a
single estimate from a single study. We report the estimate’s p-value 35 from a one-tailed test of
significance with an alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is less than zero (i.e., caps reduce
premium growth), the sample size, degrees of freedom, and the methods used to produce the
result. Tables 6a-c and 7 are similarly constructed but include estimates of the impact of noneconomic damages caps and punitive caps, respectively. Although many lessons can be drawn
from analyzing the results at the coefficient level through the lens of methodological soundness,
we focus on four general take-aways.
1. Premiums data severely limits generalizability of results

34
We employed a multi-step process to compile information about the primary studies. Research assistants trained
by us completed the initial coding. We reviewed their coding, making corrections as necessary. We also added
variables that were not identified during the initial coding process. A research assistant then checked every element
of the revised dataset against the primary studies, noting any inconsistencies. We reviewed flagged items and made
the necessary corrections. Appendix 4 contains a list of relevant variables.
35
The p-value allows us to draw inferences about the strength of the evidence for or against the tested hypothesis.
We consider p-values from one-tailed tests, which reveal the likelihood of observing a result as extreme as the
observed result assuming caps do not decrease premiums. The lower the p-value, the more confidence we have in
concluding that caps reduce premium growth. The general convention is to use a 0.05 cutoff. A thick line separates
results using this convention.
Where the primary study did not report p-values, we computed them using coefficients and standard errors. In the
few cases in which only significance levels were reported, we used the average of all possible p-values assuming a
uniform distribution (0.55 was used for results insignificant at the 10% level (0.1 + (1-0.1)/2), 0.075 for results
significant at the 10% level (0.05 + (.1-0.05)/2), etc.). For three of the 197 results (Thorpe, 2004), we could not
estimate p-values due to insufficient information.
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The nature of the premiums data researchers employed gives rise to important and yet
underappreciated limitations. None of the datasets employed in any of the primary studies allows
generalized claims about the impacts of caps. Resulting complications depend on the data
employed.
Changes in aggregate annual premiums over time might be due to changes in prices,
and/or changes in the number of polices sold, and/or changes in the types of polices sold (e.g.,
policies with varying coverage limits and deductibles). Thus, in studies that use aggregate annual
premiums written or earned by state or by company, separating changes in price from changes in
quantity sold from changes in the mix of policy types sold is impossible. 36 Aggregate premium
measures tend to be better proxies for gross revenue and business growth.

36

“Total premiums reflect not only the price of insurance but also the quantity of policies sold. We cannot tell if an
increase in total premiums means that doctors are paying more for their insurance, or if the insurer is just selling
more policies.” Mello, 2006, p. 23.
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Table 5a
Any cap; Premiums paid by doctor

KEY: OLS = ordinary least squares; wls = weighted least squares regression; quant: 10 = most profitable or largest firms, 90 = least profitable or largest firms; C = companylevel observations; S-Y = state-year observations; S = state-level observations; HCFA = Health Care Financing Administration; NAIC = National Assoc. of Insurance
Commissioners; MLM = Medical Liability Monitor; GP = general practitioner; class 3 = St. Paul Company Class 3 physician (family physician, minor surgery, no obstetrics);
mix = internists, general surgeons and OBGYN; log = log-transformed dependent variable; rse = robust standard errors; AR= auto-regressive model; CL = clustered standard
errors; chk = authors checked; BS = bootstrapped standard errors; Q = quantile regression; n/a = control not applicable. BLACK BOXES indicate methodologically sound
choice. RED BOXES (OR GRAY if in black and white) indicate choice that might generate a biased estimate or other problems. WHITE BOXES indicate method/control not
used.
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Table 5b
Any cap; Aggregate premiums
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Table 5c
Any cap; Loss ratios

29

Table 6a
Non-economic damages cap; Premiums paid by doctor

30

Table 6b
Noneconomic damages cap; Aggregate premiums

31

Table 6c
Noneconomic damages cap; Loss ratios

32

Table 7
Punitive damages cap

33

In studies that use the ratio of earned premiums to incurred losses as a proxy for
premiums, disaggregating quantity sold from price is possible but controlling for the change in
policy types sold is not. Given that tort reform likely impacts physician choices over coverage
levels, 37 if regression results suggest that tort reform reduces the price per indemnified dollar, we
are unable to discern whether amounts physicians paid for insurance decreased or whether the
distribution of policy types purchased changed. In short, changes in premium-to-loss ratios imply
nothing about changes in the absolute amount providers pay for insurance. Ratios are a better
measure of profitability.
Finally, some researchers employ data on actual prices paid by physicians in exchange
for coverage of a particular type (e.g., policies with limits of $100,000 per occurrence and
$300,000 annually for general practitioners). Using this type of data allows us to separate
quantity and price and to draw inferences about amounts physicians pay for insurance, but it does
not allow for general conclusions about prices. For example, Zuckerman et al. (1990) employ
data only on policies with $100,000/$300,000 limits for three different specialties—general
practice, general surgery and obstetrics/gynecology. They report finding that “imposing a cap on
physician liability—which in many cases is a limit on plaintiff recovery—lower premiums
substantially” (Zuckerman et al., 1990, p. 180). Given the nature of the data, however, the
authors (and all authors who use data on prices paid for particular types of policies) can claim
only that caps are associated with lower premiums related to policies with those particular
coverage levels. 38
37

For example, a physician who believes that tort reform reduces liability exposure might be willing to switch from
a policy that covers $1M per occurrence to one that covers only $500,000 per occurrence.
38
Importantly, the authors over-generalize in a second way. The regression results suggest that caps on physician
liability that allow for patients to collect amounts over the cap from patient compensation funds reduced premiums
for $100,000/$300,000 policies for three specialties in the range of 13.6% to 16.9% but also that premiums were not
impacted by caps on non-economic damages. This distinction is not mentioned in the conclusion section. General
conclusions in discussion sections and abstracts often need to be taken with a grain of salt.
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This would not be a problem if all policy types were impacted similarly by caps, but they
likely are not. For example, prices for policies with relatively high limits are more likely to be
impacted by caps because caps are more likely to bind amounts indemnified for claims brought
against high-limit policies. Furthermore, if caps impact physician choices over policy types,
changes in average risk levels and changes in demand across the mix of policy types will impact
prices separate from the direct impacts of caps. Unless prices for a broader set of policy types are
analyzed or these sorts of factors are controlled, generalizing from reported estimates is
impossible. Moreover, without knowing more about the percentage of physicians who purchase
the types of policies studied, getting a sense of the impact of caps on the market as a whole is
impossible. 39
In addition, the Medical Liability Monitor dataset, the most common dataset used to
estimate the impacts of caps on premiums paid for individual policies, comes with severe
limitations (Mello, 2006). First, the majority of price information in the dataset relates to policies
with $1M/$3M coverage for limited number of physician specialties. While we have very little
information about the distribution of policies purchased by physicians, recently reported
evidence suggests that a large segment of the physician population might purchase policies with
less coverage (Zeiler et al., 2007). Second, the MLM collects the data by surveying insurers who
voluntarily participate. Insurers who are less stable or have higher prices might be less likely to
report to the MLM for fear of sending negative signals to consumers. Thus, the survey might
generate an unrepresentative sample. Third, while the MLM reports premiums by county for
some large states, most reports are average premiums of major insurers across counties. Given
that premiums vary considerably by county, at least in some states, reporting averages might
introduce substantial noise into the estimates.
39

Mello (2006) notes similar shortcomings.
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In sum, given the nature of the premiums data employed, every original study comes with
severe limitations. No study is able to provide general estimates of the impact of caps on
insurance prices.
2. Possible Model Assumption Violations Not Reliably Addressed
One of the most glaring problems with this literature is the failure to reliably address
potential model assumption violations. The red boxes in the figures flag the estimates with
specific problems. The Tables reveal that none of the 197 estimates was generated using methods
that account for all the relevant basic assumptions. For example, none of the models employ
controls for potential simultaneity even though it is theoretically plausible (and highly likely)
that at least some state legislators implemented caps in response to premium trends. In addition,
very few studies report even testing for assumption violations and fewer employ solid techniques
to address observed or assumed violations (e.g., non-normal errors, heteroskedastic error terms
and serial correlation). When violations are assumed but do not exist, employing techniques to
address these non-existent violations can lead to unreliable estimates. In some cases techniques
to address violations are employed but no evidence is provided to demonstrate that the violation
was remedied (e.g., in some cases log-transforming the dependent variable will result in
normally distributed errors, but it might not—the distribution must be examined).
3. Measurement Issues Abound
The Tables also reveal that measurement issues are prevalent. First, many studies do not
account for effective dates, legislative repeals and judicial overturns. Many do not account for
the possibility of insurers’ delayed response to caps, and none accounts for possible anticipation
effects. Almost all estimates are derived from models that do not properly weight observations to
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account for market share and market size differentials, etc. 40 In many cases the potential for bias
caused by outliers is either ignored or not adequately accounted for. Measurement errors can lead
both to inaccurate estimates and incorrect conclusions regarding whether caps have a statistically
significant impact on premiums.
4. Lack of Controls for Alternative Explanations
The Tables also signal vast potential for biased estimates due to the lack of control for
alternative explanations. Given that reforms are regularly passed in packages, omitting controls
for other tort reforms that put downward pressure on premiums will lead to false positives when
it comes to assessing whether caps reduce premium growth. None of the studies that find a
statistically significant negative impact on premiums controls for all (or indeed most) variables
theorized to be both correlated with caps and drivers of premium variation. While some studies
employ fixed effects, these control only for variables that vary over time and are fixed across
cross sections (e.g., companies and states) and for variables that vary across cross sections and
are constant across time. In some cases, fixed effects are not employed, which invites bias if
fixed differences across states or fixed differences across time impact premiums. 41
While several of the original studies employ a difference-in-differences model that
controls for both time fixed effects and group fixed effects, none perform an analysis to
determine whether states that did not implement caps during or prior to the study period make
good control groups (Donohue and Ho, 2007). In addition, none check for pre-treatment trends,
which would necessitate the use of a different empirical model.
40

“Computing a simple average, rather than a weighted average, treats the companies as though they have identical
shares of the market. Adjusting for market share and also for the number of physicians insured in each region of the
state can make a big difference in the estimate of statewide average premiums: for Kentucky in 2002, for example,
the simple average premium for obstetrician-gynecologists was $58,287 but the weighted average premium was 19
percent less ($48,897).” Mello (2006)
41
The political leaning of states is an example of a possible state fixed effect. Time fixed effects include federal
interventions such as National Practitioner Databank reporting requirements, which some believe lead hospitals to
encourage patients to drop physicians from claims so physicians can avoid reporting to the Databank
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4. Conclusion
Tables 5-7 clearly demonstrate wide variation in methods employed to estimate the
impacts of caps on premium growth. Variation in results likely is due, at least in part, to variation
in data and method employed. While a more systematic technique referred to as meta-analysis
exists for separating the effects of modeling techniques on results, we were not able to employ it
here due to the small number of estimates relative to the number of methods we identified for our
analysis. Thus, we are unable to make empirical claims about systematic impacts of different
methods on estimates. The Tables, however, make a clear case for the use of an abundance of
caution when deciding whether to put any amount of weight on any one study.
We detected no differences in methodological quality between results that support the
caps-reduce-premiums claim and those that do not. One question we might ask is: which
estimate is most reliable from a methods perspective? More generally, we might wish to get a
sense of how much weight can be assigned to each estimate given the methods employed.
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered using the information we report. Even if some
of the estimates were produced using nearly perfect methods, just one model violation or omitted
variable might lead to more severe problems than those produced by models with several
deficiencies.
In closing, we turn to the big picture. Most agree that our primary goals are to increase
access to health care, improve its quality and to lower its cost (or to at least achieve efficient use
of resources allocated to health care markets). These goals might suggest that we need to turn our
attention to the impacts of damages caps on other important outcomes, including physician
supply, defensive medicine, health care costs and health care insurance premiums. While these
outcomes are important and studying them is necessary for a comprehensive view of the impact
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of caps, proponents of caps continue to make claims about their impact on medical malpractice
insurance premiums, and these claims continue to impact legislative outcomes and court
decisions on the constitutionality of caps. It remains important, therefore, to get a solid handle on
general inferences we can draw from the empirical literature that focuses on this albeit narrow
question. Our analysis reveals not only that the results are mixed, despite claims to the contrary,
but also that more methodologically sound research that employs more comprehensive data is
essential.
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Appendix 1: Scope of literature reviews
Time period
covered 42

Method for inclusion

Independent
variables
addressed

Dependent variables
addressed

Number of
studies
included 43

OTA
1993

1990-1992

Studies employing systematic
empirical methods, excluded
single-state studies, studies predating 1980, descriptive studies and
literature reviews

Various tort
reforms

Premiums, severity,
frequency

3

CBO
2004

1993-2004

No explicit method

Various tort
reforms

Kessler
2006

1990-1992

No explicit method

Various tort
reforms (and
other reforms)

Kane
2005,
2007

1985-2006

Papers that employ statistical
techniques to account for
competing explanations

Focused on caps,
brief mention of
other reforms

1990-2006

Better studies (control for
differences across states and time
and nonrandom enactment of the
law). Strongest studies use fixedeffects.

Damages caps

Review

Nelson
2007

Mello
20042010

1985-2006

Specifically identified criteria for
rigor, but included weak studies

Various tort
reforms (and
other reforms)

RAND
2011

1985-2006

Used Mello’s selected studies

Various tort
reforms

Premiums, brief mention
of frequency and
severity, defensive
medicine
Brief mention of
premiums, claim
severity, defensive
medicine, various other
aspects of the
malpractice system
Premiums, brief mention
of frequency and
severity, physician
supply, defensive
medicine
Premiums, defensive
medicine, physician
supply
Premiums, frequency,
severity, physician
supply, defensive
medicine, quality of
care, defense costs
Premiums, frequency,
severity, health
expenditures

3

2

5

9

8

7
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The time period covered includes only studies addressing the effect of damage caps on premiums. The time period
reflects the range of publication dates covered by the primary studies included in the review.

43

This number includes only studies addressing observed (as opposed to simulated) effects of medical malpractice
damages caps on premiums. We did not count studies that group caps with other types of tort reforms even when the
review author included these types of studies in the analysis. We also did not include primary studies that did not
produce regression results.
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Appendix 2: Studies of the impact of caps on premiums included in each literature review
Sloan
1985
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1993
CBO
2004
Kessler
2006
Nelson
2007
Kane
2005,
2007
Mello
20042010
RAND
2011

Zuckerman
1990

Blackmon
1991

Barker
1992

X

X

X

Viscusi
1993

Viscusi
1995

X
X
X

Born
1998

Gius
1998

Danzon
2004

X

Viscusi
2005

Kilgore
2006

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Thorpe
2004

X

X
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Appendix 3: Search strategy
Our goal was to locate all relevant reported and unreported regression results included in
studies of whether damages caps (of any sort) impact premiums. Table A3 summarizes the
specific search strategies by database. When these search terms generated roughly 250 or fewer
results, we evaluated each for relevance. We used full text search where available (and where it
did not generate too many results) or, alternatively, we searched using keywords or subject
headings. For several databases, we were able to use a very general search term “damage cap”
OR “damages cap” OR “tort reform” without generating an unduly number of results. For two
additional databases, the general phrase “tort reform” generated too many results, so we
narrowed the search to: “damage cap” OR “damages cap” OR (“tort reform” AND (empirical
OR regression)).
For several additional databases, the term “tort reform” (even when paired with these
additional search terms) generated large numbers of results, as did “damage cap” OR “damages
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Nelson cites to a 1990 report, which was a less detailed study than the 1991 results reported in Blackmon’s book.
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cap” without additional search terms. The search term (“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND
(empirical OR regression) was used for several databases. For several additional databases, the
term “empirical” generated too many results when paired with “damage cap” OR “damages cap,”
we used the search term ((“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND regression).
Table A3: Search terms by database
Search terms
“damage cap” OR “damages cap” OR “tort
reform”
“damage cap” OR “damages cap” OR (“tort
reform” AND (empirical OR regression))
(“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND
(empirical OR regression)
(“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND
regression
(“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND
regression AND “medical malpractice”)

Databases
SSRN, Econlit, Catalogue of US Government
Publications, ProQuest Congressional
PubMed, Index to Legal Periodicals
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, JSTOR, Academic
Search Primer, ABI Inform Complete, BePress
Hein Online, Westlaw (law review database), Google
Books and Google Scholar*
Google

* Additional searches performed in Google Scholar were performed using the following terms:
noneconomic damages caps medical malpractice insurance regression, tort reform regression
damage caps medical malpractice, claim severity tort reform regression, claim frequency tort
reform regression, health insurance premiums tort reform regression, tort reform regression,
liability insurance regression medical malpractice.

Finally, we used the most specific search term ((“damage cap” OR “damages cap”) AND
regression AND “medical malpractice”) in Google. This generated nearly 700 results, and we
reviewed the first 250. We also performed a number of Google Scholar searches using the
following search terms individually: damages caps, medical malpractice insurance regression,
tort reform regression damage caps medical malpractice, claim severity tort reform regression,
claim frequency tort reform regression, health insurance premiums tort reform regression, tort
reform regression, liability insurance regression medical malpractice.
An additional search was performed using the following databases: NBER, Wiley Online
Library, Science Direct, Lexis Nexis, Proquest, Health Affairs, and the Georgetown Law
Library’s E-Journal Finder). Search terms employed included: damage caps, medical malpractice
damage caps, empirical AND tort AND malpractice, insurance AND tort liability, empirical
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AND tort reform, medical malpractice, medical malpractice AND tort reform, damage caps
AND malpractice AND reform, caps AND damages, and summary((damage /3 cap) OR tort
reform /100 economic! and empirical). To supplement this search, we reviewed the
bibliographies of the primary studies and the literature reviews.
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